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Abstract—Due to massive amounts of data distributed across
multiple locations, distributed machine learning has attracted
a lot of research interests. Alternating Direction Method of
Multipliers (ADMM) is a powerful method of designing dis-
tributed machine learning algorithm, whereby each agent com-
putes over local datasets and exchanges computation results
with its neighbor agents in an iterative procedure. There exists
significant privacy leakage during this iterative process if the
local data is sensitive. In this paper, we propose a differentially
private ADMM algorithm (P-ADMM) to provide dynamic zero-
concentrated differential privacy (dynamic zCDP), by inserting
Gaussian noise with linearly decaying variance. We prove that
P-ADMM has the same convergence rate compared to the non-
private counterpart, i.e., O(1/K) with K being the number of
iterations and linear convergence for general convex and strongly
convex problems while providing differentially private guarantee.
Moreover, through our experiments performed on real-world
datasets, we empirically show that P-ADMM has the best-known
performance among the existing differentially private ADMM
based algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of sensing technologies, the
vast amount of data has already been generated in recent
years. Building machine learning models over such deluge
data in one machine is impossible, especially in many cases
that data is distributed across different locations. Therefore,
the advent of distributed machine learning is imperative to
reduce storage and local computational costs, while improving
robustness of machine learning models [1]. Several distributed
optimization approaches have been developed to optimize
large-scale machine learning problems. In particular, as a
popular optimization technique, alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM) [2] [3] has been very often used in
the context of distributed machine learning [4]–[6], which is
extremely robust and easy to implement. Furthermore, ADMM
based algorithms can typically achieve a fast convergence rate
O(1/K), where K is the number of iterations [7].
In the distributed setting, the agents on a connected net-
work process data locally by minimizing small optimization
problems, and exchange the local results among the neighbors
to arrive at a global minimization solution. However, the
communication among agents in such a distributed manner
brings about privacy concerns if the local agent’s training
data contains sensitive information such as salary or medical
records. Therefore, there is a great need of privacy preserving
algorithm to ensure privacy guarantee in such iterative pro-
cesses. Differential privacy [8] is a well-defined framework
for quantifying privacy risk revealed by an algorithm from
adversarial inference. Briefly, differentially private algorithms
prevent the adversary with arbitrary background knowledge
by obfuscating the query responses. In the literature, there
are some pioneering work on integrating differential privacy
and ADMM [9]–[12]. In [9], Zhang and Zhu proposed two
privacy preserving ADMM algorithms by perturbing the dual
variable and the primal variable, respectively; However, both
of algorithms just bounded the privacy loss of one agent at a
single iteration. Later, in [10] a penalty perturbation method to
bound the total privacy loss of all agents instead of only one
agent during the entire process is developed. Moreover, in [11]
based on the same penalty perturbation method, Zhang et al.
presented a modified ADMM algorithm by repeatedly using
the existing computational results to reduce the computational
burden and reach a less accumulated privacy loss. In addition,
in [12], Huang et al. employed an augmented Lagrangian
function with first order approximation at all iterations, while
they consider a network with star topology, i.e., a central server
is required which summarizes all shared primal variables and
broadcasts it back to all agents over the network.
In this paper, we propose a differentially private ADMM al-
gorithm (P-ADMM) to remedy privacy concerns of distributed
machine learning. Specifically, a linearly decaying Gaussian
noise is added to perturb exchanged variables at each iteration.
Then a new concept to quantify privacy leakage of a general
distributed algorithm, called dynamic zero-concentrated dif-
ferential privacy (dynamic zCDP), is developed, which stems
from the definition of zero-concentrated differential privacy
[13] and enjoys significant accuracy and tight privacy loss
composition. Furthermore, we theoretically prove the conver-
gence rate of P-ADMM on general convex and strongly convex
problems and provide a rigorous privacy analysis. Overall, the
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a differentially private ADMM algorithm (P-
ADMM) by introducing a Gaussian noise with a linearly
decaying variance to address the privacy concerns in
distributed machine learning over large datasets.
• We introduce a new privacy framework to quantify the
privacy leakage in a distributed and iterative setting,
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called dynamic zCDP, and present the privacy analysis
of P-ADMM based on this privacy framework.
• We provide convergence analysis of P-ADMM for gen-
eral convex and strongly convex objectives. Note that our
analysis shows that P-ADMM has a linear convergence
rate for strongly convex problems. For general convex
problems, P-ADMM shows an O(1/K) convergence rate,
where K is the iteration number.
• Using real-world datasets, we demonstrate that the algo-
rithmic performance of P-ADMM significantly outper-
forms the state-of-the-art differentially private ADMM
based algorithms. Specifically, P-ADMM exhibits nearly
the same convergence properties as the non-private ver-
sion while preserving differential privacy.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
problem formulation, and definition of ADMM and differential
privacy. Then, the definition of dynamic zCDP and a privacy
preserving version of ADMM are presented in Section III.
In Section IV, we provide the convergence analysis of the
proposed algorithm and the numerical experiments based
on real-world datasets are shown in Section V. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM SETTING AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem Setting
Throughout the paper, we consider a bidirectional network
given by an undirected graph G = {N , E}, which contains
the set of agents/nodes N = {1, · · · , N} and the set of edges
E with |E| = E. The total number of communication links
among connected agents in E is denoted as 2E. Let Vi denote
the set of neighboring agents of agent i. For any agent i, it can
only exchange information among its neighbors in Vi. Here,
each agent i contains a dataset Di = {(yni , zni )}|Di|n=1, where
yni ∈ C∗ is a feature vector and the corresponding label is
zni ∈ Rz . The goal of our problem is to train a classifier w ∈
Rd over the union datasets Dˆ = ∪i∈NDi in a decentralized
manner (i.e., no centralized controller/fusion center). In order
to train this classifier, we model the problem in the following
regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem
min
w∈Rd
N∑
i=1
1
|Di|
|Di|∑
n=1
L(zni , yni , w) +R(w), (1)
where L(·) : Rz × C∗ × Rd → R is the loss function, and
R(w) : Rd → R is the regularizer to prevent overfitting.
Empirical risk minimization as a supervised learning prob-
lem is arising very often in machine learning [14]. Examples
of ERM consists of the widely applicable problems of classi-
fication and regression in machine learning. For instance, in
binary classification problems (zni ∈ {+1,−1}), we get linear
support vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression by
setting the loss function L(zni , yni , w) = max{1−zni wT yni , 0}
and L(zni , yni , w) = log(1 + exp(−zni wT yni )), respectively.
Moreover, a further introduction of ERM in machine learning
can also be found in [15] [16].
B. Preliminaries
1) Conventional ADMM: To decentralize ERM prob-
lem (1), we introduce a variable xi ∈ Rd for agent i. Then,
the ERM problem (1) can be formulated as follows
min
{xi},{pij}
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
s.t. xi = pij , xj = pij , ∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
(2)
where fi(xi) = 1|Di|
∑|Di|
n=1 L(zni , yni , xi)+ 1NR(xi) [17]. Note
that the objective function of (2) can be easily decoupled
across the agents, and then each agent i obtains a local
classifier xi by only minimizing objective fi(xi) over its
own dataset. Moreover, since the network is connected, the
constraints xi = pij and xj = pij enforce global consensus,
i.e., all local classifiers should be equal. Therefore, (2) is
equivalent to (1). The ADMM algorithm can intuitively solve
the above optimization problem in (2) in a decentralized and
collaborative manner.
To specify the ADMM algorithm, we rewrite problem (2)
in a matrix form. Defining x := [x1; · · · ;xN ] ∈ RNd and p ∈
R2Ed as a vector concatenating all local variables xi and pij
separately. Further, define two blocks A1 and A2 ∈ R2Ed×Nd
that are consisted of 2E ×N blocks of d× d matrices. If pij
is the q-th block of p and (i, j) ∈ E , then both of the (q, i)-th
block of A1 and (q, j)-th block of A2 are equal to identity
matrices Id. Otherwise the blocks are null. As a result, the
matrix form of problem in (2) can be written as follows
min
x,p
f(x) + g(p),
s.t. Ax+Bp = 0,
(3)
where matrices A := [A1;A2], B := [−I2Ed;−I2Ed], and
aggregate function f : RNd → R is defined as f(x) =∑N
i=1 fi(xi), and g(p) = 0, which fits the standard form of
ADMM.
By assigning Lagrangian multipliers λ ∈ R4Ed, the aug-
mented Lagrangian function of (3) is given by
Lc(x, p, λ) = f(x) + 〈Ax+Bp, λ〉+ η
2
‖Ax+Bp‖22. (4)
The idea of ADMM algorithm is to alternatively minimize
Lc(x, p, λ) regarding variables x, p and λ. At a specific
iteration k + 1, ADMM has the following steps
∇f(xk+1) +ATλk + ηAT (Axk+1 +Bpk) = 0, (5)
BTλk + ηBT (Axk+1 +Bpk+1) = 0, (6)
λk+1 − λk − η(Axk+1 +Bpk+1) = 0. (7)
If we let λ = [β; γ] with β, γ ∈ R2EN , H+ = AT1 + AT2 and
H− = AT1 −AT2 , the above ADMM algorithm updates can be
reduced to
∇f(xk+1) + αk + 2ηMxk+1 − ηL+xk = 0, (8)
αk+1 − αk − ηL−xk+1 = 0, (9)
where α = H−β ∈ RNd is a new multiplier, and M = 12 (L++
L−) with L+ = 12H+H
T
+ and L− =
1
2H−H
T
− . Note that L+
is the signless Laplacian matrix and L− is the signed Laplacian
matrix of the network.
Remember that the ADMM algorithm updates (8) and (9)
are in matrix form. Hence, each agent i uses the following
updates to obtain its own variable xi,
∇fi(xk+1i ) + αki + 2η|Vi|xk+1i = η
|Vi|xki + ∑
j∈Vi
xkj
 ,
(10)
αk+1i = α
k
i + η
|Vi|xk+1i −∑
j∈Vi
xk+1j
 ,
(11)
where αi ∈ Rd is the local Lagrange multiplier of agent i and
α is the concatenated form of all αi.
At iteration k+ 1, agent i updates xk+1i through (10) using
its own previous results xki , α
k
i and its neighbors’ previous
results xkj with j ∈ Vi, and then broadcasts xk+1i to all its
neighbors. After collecting all of its neighbors results xk+1j ,
agent i updates its local multiplier αi through (11).
2) Differential Privacy: Differential privacy (DP) intro-
duced in [8] [18] provides rigorous privacy guarantees by
injecting random noise to perturb the released statistical results
obtained from sensitive datasets. It ensures that the adver-
sary with enough background knowledge cannot infer any
information about a specific record with high confidence. The
definition of differential privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). We say a randomized al-
gorithm M gives (, δ)-differential privacy if for any datasets
D and Dˆ that differ in at most a single record, the privacy
loss random variable of an output o ∈ Range(M)
Z(o) = ln
Pr[M(D) = o]
Pr[M(Dˆ) = o]
is bounded by  with probability at least 1− δ.
The Gaussian mechanism is a generic method for satisfying
(, δ)-differential privacy by adding Gaussian noise calibrated
to the query function’s sensitivity. Then, we define the sensi-
tivity as follows.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a query function
f(·) that takes as input a dataset D is defined as
∆f = max
D,Dˆ
‖f(D)− f(Dˆ)‖2,
where D and Dˆ are any two neighboring datasets differing in
at most one record.
Based on the definition of sensitivity, we show the Gaussian
mechanism in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Gaussian Mechanism). For a query function
f : D → Rd with sensitivity ∆f , the Gaussian Mechanism
that adds noise generated from the Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2Id) to the output of function f enjoys (, δ)-differential
privacy, where , δ ∈ (0, 1) and σ ≥
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)∆f
 .
A relaxed version of differential privacy called zero-
concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) is proposed in [13],
which aims to make significantly tighter privacy bounds for
privacy preserving iterative algorithms. The definition of ρ-
zCDP is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (ρ-zCDP). For all τ ∈ (1,∞), a randomized
algorithm M is ρ-zCDP if for all neighboring datasets D
and Dˆ, we have
E[e(τ−1)Z(o)] ≤ e(τ−1)τρ,
where Z(o) is the privacy loss variable of an outcome of M.
The following three lemmas [13] shows the Gaussian mech-
anism satisfies zCDP and the composition theorem of ρ-zCDP
and the relationship between ρ-zCDP and (, δ)-DP.
Lemma 1. The Gaussian mechanism, defined in Definition 1,
satisfies ∆2f/(2σ
2)-zCDP.
Lemma 2. If randomized mechanisms M1, ...,Mk sat-
isfies ρ1-zCDP,...,ρk-zCDP, their composition defined as
(M1, ...,Mk) is
∑k
i=1 ρk-zCDP.
Lemma 3. If a randomized mechanism M provides ρ-zCDP,
then for any δ ∈ (0, 1) M satisfies (ρ + 2√ρ ln(1/δ), δ)-
differential privacy.
C. Privacy Concerns
During the iterative process, there is no need for each
agent to share its own dataset, but the risk of information
leakage still exists if the local datasets contain sensitive
information like medical or financial records. We assume the
adversary’s goal is to learn the private information of training
datasets. The adversary is able to access all shared variables
{xki }Ni=1 by eavesdropping the communications among agents
and also have arbitrary auxiliary information. After obtaining
exchanged variables during iterative process, the adversary can
perform attacks (e.g., model inversion attack [19]) to infer
private information of the training datasets.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE ADMM
To mitigate the privacy risk, we propose a new relaxed ver-
sion of dynamic differential privacy [9], called dynamic zero-
concentrated differential privacy (dynamic zCDP) to provide
privacy guarantee of the iterative algorithm.
Definition 4 (Dynamic ρk-zCDP). Consider a connected
network G = {N , E} that contains a set of agents/nodes
N = {1, · · · , N} and each agent possesses a training dataset
Di. We denote xki as the result of the i-th agent at k-iteration.
A distributed algorithm gives dynamic ρki -zCDP if for all
datasets Di and Dˆi differing at most a single record, and
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private ADMM (P-ADMM)
1: Input: datasets {Di}Ni=1; randomly initialize x0i and α0i =
0d; initial variances (σ2)
1
i and variance decrease rate R ∈
(0, 1) for all agents i;
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · ,K − 1 do
3: for i = 1, · · · , N do
4: Compute xk+1i via (10).
5: Generate noise ξk+1i ∼ N (0, (σ2)k+1i Id).
6: Perturb xk+1i : x˜
k+1
i = x
k+1
i + ξ
k+1
i .
7: end for
8: for i = 1, · · · , N do
9: Broadcast x˜k+1i to all neighbors j ∈ Vi.
10: end for
11: for i = 1, · · · , N do
12: Compute αk+1i via (12).
13: end for
14: end for
15: Output: {x˜Ki }Ni=1
for all agents i ∈ N , and for all k during a learning process,
the privacy loss variable of an outcome o
Zki (o) = ln
Pr[xki,Di = o]
Pr[xk
i,Dˆi
= o]
satisfies
E[e(τ−1)Z
k
i (o)] ≤ e(τ−1)τρki ,
∀τ ∈ (1,∞).
Compared with dynamic differential privacy proposed
in [9], dynamic zero-concentrated differential privacy directly
inherits desirable properties of zero-concentrated differential
privacy such as enjoying better accuracy and providing signif-
icantly tighter privacy loss bound under composition.
Based on the definition of dynamic zCDP, we propose a
differentially private ADMM algorithm (P-ADMM) by inject-
ing Gaussian noise in the iterative algorithm. As shown in
Algorithm 1, the main idea of P-ADMM is to perturb the local
primal variables {xk+1i }Ni=1 before broadcasting them to the
neighbors. The whole procedure is summarized as follows: at
iteration k+1, each agent i obtains the primal variable xk+1i by
solving the subproblem in (10) over its own dataset Di. Then,
each agent generates a random noise vector ξk+1i drawn from a
Gaussian distribution N (0, (σ2)k+1i Id). After that, the primal
variable xk+1i is perturbed by the noise vector generated from
the i-th agent, and then agent i sends the perturbed primal
variable x˜k+1i to all the neighboring agents j ∈ Vi. Finally,
each agent updates the dual variable αk+1i through
αk+1i = α
k
i + η
|Vi|x˜k+1i −∑
j∈Vi
x˜k+1j
 . (12)
During the whole iterative process, we assume that there is
a rate R ∈ (0, 1) to describe the decrease of noise variance
(σ2)
k+1
i . In other words, we consider a Gaussian mechanism
with a linearly decaying variance to provide differential pri-
vacy guarantee and achieve a significantly fast convergence
rate.
Before showing P-ADMM satisfies dynamic zCDP, we first
estimate the sensitivity of the local primal variable xk+1i as
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume the ‖∇fi(x)‖2 ≤ V , and then the
sensitivity of local primal variable xk+1i , denoted by ∆i, is
V
η|Vi| .
Proof. According to subproblem (10) and sensitivity definition
(2), for two neighboring datasets Di and Dˆi, we have
xk+1i,Di = −
1
2η|Vi|∇fi(x
k+1
i , Di)
+
1
2|Vi|
|Vi|xki + ∑
j∈Vi
xkj
− 1
2η|Vi|α
k
i ,
xk+1
i,Dˆi
= − 1
2η|Vi|∇fi(x
k+1
i , Dˆi)
+
1
2|Vi|
|Vi|xki + ∑
j∈Vi
xkj
− 1
2η|Vi|α
k
i .
The sensitivity of xk+1i is
∆i = ‖xk+1i,Di − xk+1i,Dˆi‖2
=
1
2η|Vi| ‖∇fi(x
k+1
i , Di)−∇fi(xk+1i , Dˆi)‖2
≤ V
η|Vi| .
The following theorems show the privacy guarantee of P-
ADMM.
Theorem 2. The P-ADMM algorithm satisfies the dynamic
ρk+1i -zCDP, where ρ
k+1
i =
V 2
2η2|Vi|2(σ2)k+1i
.
Proof. The privacy loss variable of x˜k+1i at an output o over
two neighboring datasets Di and Dˆi is given by
Zk+1i (o) = ln
Pr[x˜k+1i,Di = o]
Pr[x˜k+1
i,Dˆi
= o]
.
Since x˜k+1i = x
k+1
i + ξ
k+1
i and ξ
k+1
i ∼ N (0, (σ2)k+1i Id),
the probability distribution x˜k+1i,Di is N (xk+1i,Di , (σ2)
k+1
i Id), and
the probability distribution of x˜k+1
i,Dˆi
is N (xk+1
i,Dˆi
, (σ2)
k+1
i Id).
According to Lemma 2.5 in [13] and ∀τ ∈ (1,∞), the Re´nyi
divergence of this two probability distribution is given by
Dτ (N (xk+1i,Di , (σ2)
k+1
i Id)‖N (xk+1i,Dˆi , (σ
2)
k+1
i Id))
=
τ‖xk+1i,Di − xk+1i,Dˆi‖
2
2
2(σ2)
k+1
i
=
τ∆2i
2(σ2)
k+1
i
.
Then,
E[e(τ−1)Z
k+1
i (o)]
≤ e(τ−1)Dτ (N (x
k+1
i,Di
,(σ2)
k+1
i Id)‖N (xk+1i,Dˆi ,(σ
2)
k+1
i Id))
= e(τ−1)τ∆
2
i /[2(σ
2)
k+1
i ]
≤ e(τ−1)τ
V 2
2η2|Vi|2(σ2)k+1i
= e(τ−1)τρ
k+1
i .
Therefore, P-ADMM provides the dynamic ρk+1i -zCDP at
each agent i with ρk+1i =
V 2
2η2|Vi|2(σ2)k+1i
.
Similar to dynamic differential privacy in [9], the limitations
of dynamic zero-concentrated differential privacy is that the
privacy constraint exists at each iteration and the privacy loss
is only calculated at a particular iteration. Since the primal
variables are generated and broadcasted during the entire
iterative process, then there is a great need to compute the
total privacy loss during all iterations. The following theorem
therefore qualifies the total privacy loss of P-ADMM by using
(, δ)-differential privacy.
Theorem 3. For any R ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1), the P-ADMM
algorithm is (, δ)-differential privacy with
 = max
i∈N
 ρ1i (1−RK)
RK−1 −RK + 2
√
ρ1i (1−RK) ln 1/δ
RK−1 −RK
 ,
where ρ1i =
V 2
2η2|Vi|2(σ2)1i .
Proof. According to Theorem 2, P-ADMM satisfies dy-
namic ρk+1i -zCDP. It ensures that each primal variable x
k+1
i
perturbed by noise drawn from the Gaussian distribution
N (0, (σ2)k+1i Id) is ρk+1i -zCDP at k + 1 iteration. By the
composition theorem in Lemma 2 and for each agent, P-
ADMM provides
∑K−1
k=0 ρ
k+1
i -zCDP. Since we assume the
noise variance (σ2)k+1i = R(σ
2)
k
i , together with the result
in Theorem 2, the relationship between ρk+1i and ρ
k
i is
ρk+1i = ρ
k
i /R, and P-ADMM is ρ
total
i -zCDP for each agent
with ρtotali = ρ
1
i
1−RK
RK−1−RK . By Lemma 3 and ∀δ ∈ (0, 1),
P-ADMM satisfies (totali , δ)-differential privacy, where
totali = ρ
total
i + 2
√
ρtotali ln 1/δ
=
ρ1i (1−RK)
RK−1 −RK + 2
√
ρ1i (1−RK) ln 1/δ
RK−1 −RK .
Therefore, considering all of agents, the total privacy loss of
P-ADMM is bounded by (, δ)-differential privacy with
 = max
i∈N
totali
= max
i∈N
 ρ1i (1−RK)
RK−1 −RK + 2
√
ρ1i (1−RK) ln 1/δ
RK−1 −RK
 ,
where ρ1i =
V 2
2η2|Vi|2(σ2)1i , R ∈ (0, 1), and δ ∈ (0, 1).
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the convergence analysis of pro-
posed differential private ADMM algorithm for both strongly
convex and general convex objective functions. For a clear
presentation, we also present the updates of P-ADMM in
matrix format.
At k+ 1 iteration, since each agent uses the computational
result of previous iteration x˜k to update variable xk+1, and
then sends to its neighbors after perturbed, the matrix form of
P-ADMM algorithm updates are
∇f(xk+1) + αk + 2ηMxk+1 − ηL+x˜k = 0, (13)
αk+1 − αk − ηL−x˜k+1 = 0, (14)
where x˜k = xk + ξk and ξk ∈ RNd is a vector concatenating
all noise variables ξki .
Before stating our main results, we first define two auxiliary
sequences denoted by rk and qk. Given the perturbed primal
variable x˜k, we let
rk =
k∑
s=0
Qx˜s, qk =
(
rk
xk
)
, G =
(
ηI 0
0 ηL+/2
)
,
where Q =
√
L−/2. Remember L− is the Laplcaian matrix
and the network is connected, the following properties holds:
L− is positive semi-definite and Null(L−) = span{1}. As
a result, Null(Q) = span{1}. We also denote φmax(Gˆ) and
φmin(Gˆ) as the nonzero largest and smallest singular value
for a semidefinite matrix Gˆ, respectively.
Using the second update (14) of the matrix form of P-
ADMM, the first step (13) can be written as
xk+1 = −M
−1∇f(xk+1)
2η
+
M−1L+x˜k
2
− M
−1L−
2
k∑
s=0
x˜s.
(15)
Based on the auxiliary sequence rk and the fact M = (L− +
L+)/2, the above equation (15) can be rewritten as
∇f(xk+1)
η
+ 2Qrk+1 + L+(x˜
k+1 − x˜k) = 2M−1ξk+1.
(16)
A. Strongly Convex Case
In this case, we consider the objective function f(x) is
µ-strongly convex and v-smooth. Then, according to the
definition of smoothness and strong convexity, we have
f(xk+1) ≥ f(x∗) + 〈∇f(x∗), xk+1 − x∗〉+ µ‖xk+1 − x∗‖22
and
‖∇f(xk+1)−∇f(x∗)‖2 ≤ v‖xk+1 − x∗‖2,
where we denote x∗ as an optimal solution of (3).
Before showing the convergence of P-ADMM, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 5 ( [20]). There exists qˆ∗ =
(
r∗
x∗
)
for the r∗ found
in Lemma 4 of [21] such that
‖qk+1 − qˆ∗‖2G
≤ ‖q
k − qˆ∗‖2G
1 + ζ
+
P
1 + ζ
‖ξk+1‖22 +
1
1 + ζ
〈
ξk+1,
ηL+(x˜
k+1 − x˜k) + 2ηQ(rk+1 − r∗) + 2ηM(xk+1 − x∗)〉
with ζ = 2(κ2−1)µφ
2
min(Q)φ
2
min(L+)
κ2v2φ2min(L+)+2µφ
2
max(L+)
, P = ζη
2κ2φ
2
max(M)
φ2min(Q)
+
ζη2φ2max(L+)κ3
4 and η =
√
κ1κ2(κ3−1)v2
κ3(κ2−1)φ2min(Q)φ2min(L+) , where
κ1 = 1 +
2µφ2max(L+)
v2φ2min(L+)
, κ2 > 1 and κ3 > 1 and ‖x‖2G is
denoted as ‖x‖2G = 〈x,Gx〉 for any matrix x and G.
Following Lemma 5, we establish the linear convergence of
P-ADMM for the strongly convex problem in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose the objective function f(x) is µ-
strongly convex and v-smooth. In P-ADMM, let S2 =
4
(1+4θ)φ2max(L+)
,W = (1+4θ)φ
2
max(L+)
(1−b)(1+ζ−4θ)φ2min(L+) , and S3 =
4ζκ2φ
2
max(M)
φ2
min
(Q)
+φ2max
(√
ζ+
√
2(κ2−1)φ2min(Q)
θκ1κ2
)2
(1−b)(1+ζ)(1+ζ−4θ)φ2min(L+) +
b(κ4−1)
1−b . If one
chooses b and κ2 satisfying (1 − b)(1 + ζ)φ2min(L+) >
φ2max(L+) and chooses 0 < θ < min{H1, H2}
with H1 =
b(1+ζ)φ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)
4bφ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)+16φ2max(M) , H2 =
(1−b)(1+ζ)φ2min(L+)−φ2max(L+)
4φ2max(L+)+4(1−b)φ2min(L+) , then the following holds for
E[‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22] ≤W k+1
(‖x˜0 − x∗‖22 + S2‖r0 − r∗‖22
+
dS3
∑N
i=1(σ
2)1iW
W −R
)
with 0 < R < W < 1, where the expectation is taking with
respect to the noise, κ1 and ζ are found in Lemma 5, κ3 =√
v2φ2min(L+)+2µφ
2
max(L+)
θκ1v2φ2min(L+)
+ 1 and κ4 > 1.
Proof. The result in Lemma 7 can be rewritten as
‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 + S1‖rk+1 − r∗‖22
≤W (‖x˜k − x∗‖22 + S2‖rk − r∗‖22) + S3‖ξk+1‖22,
where S1 = 4(1−b)φ2min(L+) , S2 =
4
(1+4θ)φ2max(L+)
,W =
(1+4θ)φ2max(L+)
(1−b)(1+ζ−4θ)φ2min(L+) , and
S3 =
4ζκ2φ
2
max(M)
φ2min(Q)
+ φ2max
(√
ζ +
√
2(κ2−1)φ2min(Q)
θκ1κ2
)2
(1− b)(1 + ζ)(1 + ζ − 4θ)φ2min(L+)
+
b(κ4 − 1)
1− b
by setting κ3 =
√
v2φ2min(L+)+2µφ
2
max(L+)
θκ1v2φ2min(L+)
+ 1. Furthermore,
by setting (1 − b)φ2min(L+) ≤ (1 + θ)φ2max(L+), we have
S1 ≥ S2. Therefore, we obtain
‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 + S1‖rk+1 − r∗‖22 ≤W k+1
(‖x˜0 − x∗‖22
+ S2‖r0 − r∗‖22 +
k+1∑
s=1
W−sS3‖ξk+1‖22
)
.
Since S1‖rk+1 − r∗‖22 > 0, we have
‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 ≤W k+1
(‖x˜0 − x∗‖22 + S2‖r0 − r∗‖22
+
k+1∑
s=1
W−sS3‖ξk+1‖22
)
. (17)
Next, we constrain 0 < W < 1 by choosing θ from
0 < θ <
(1− b)(1 + ζ)φ2min(L+)− φ2max(L+)
4φ2max(L+) + 4(1− b)φ2min(L+)
.
Together with the constraint of θ in Lemma 7, θ should be
chosen as 0 < θ < min{H1, H2}, where
H1 =
b(1 + ζ)φ2min(L+)(1− 1/κ4)
4bφ2min(L+)(1− 1/κ4) + 16φ2max(M)
and
H2 =
(1− b)(1 + ζ)φ2min(L+)− φ2max(L+)
4φ2max(L+) + 4(1− b)φ2min(L+)
.
Taking expectation of (17) and choosing variance decrease rate
R less than the linear convergence rate W , we obtain
E[‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22] ≤W k+1
(‖x˜0 − x∗‖22 + S2‖r0 − r∗‖22
+
k+1∑
s=1
W−sS3E‖ξk+1‖22
)
≤W k+1(‖x˜0 − x∗‖22 + S2‖r0 − r∗‖22
+
dS3
∑N
i=1(σ
2)1iW
W −R
)
.
In the first inequality, we use E[ξk+1] = 0. In the second
inequality, we use the sum of infinity terms of the geometric
sequence.
Remark 1. Under a strong convexity assumption, P-ADMM
exhibits the same linear convergence result of non-private
decentralized ADMM in [22]. As we can see from above
theorem, if the variance of Gaussian noise decays much faster
than the distance ‖x˜k+1−x∗‖22, then P-ADMM will converge
at a linear rate to the minimizer.
B. Convex Case
Some objectives like Lasso and group Lasso are non-
strongly convex, so, in this case, we consider the objective
function f(x) is general convex. In other words, by the
definition of convex, we have
f(xk+1)− f(x∗) ≤ 〈xk+1 − x∗,∇f(xk+1)〉 ,
where x∗ is the optimal solution of (3).
Lemma 6. For any r ∈ RNd and k > 0, we have
f(xk+1)− f(x∗)
η
+
〈
2r,Qxk+1
〉
≤ 1
η
(‖qk − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − q∗‖2G)+ φ2max(L+)2φmin(L−)‖ξk‖22
+
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉 ,
where q∗ =
(
r
x∗
)
, and ‖x‖2G is denoted as ‖x‖2G = 〈x,Gx〉
for any matrix x and G.
Proof. Using convexity and (16), ∀r ∈ RNd, we have
f(xk+1)− f(x∗)
η
+
〈
2r,Qxk+1
〉
≤ 1
η
〈
xk+1 − x∗,∇f(xk+1)〉+ 〈2r,Qxk+1〉
≤ 〈xk+1 − x∗, 2M−1ξk+1 − 2Q(rk+1 − r)
− L+(x˜k+1 − x˜k)
〉
=
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L+(xk − xk+1)
〉
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗,
L+(x˜
k − xk)〉+ 〈xk+1 − x∗, 2Q(r − rk+1)〉
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L−(x˜k+1 − xk+1)
〉
=
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L+(xk − xk+1)
〉
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗,
L+(x˜
k − xk)〉+ 〈x˜k+1 − x∗, 2Q(r − rk+1)〉
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L−(x˜k+1 − xk+1)
〉
+
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(r − rk+1〉 . (18)
Recall Null(Q) = span{1} and x∗ is the optimal con-
sensus solution, so we have 〈x∗, Q〉 = 0. By the definition
of sequence rk, we have x˜k+1 = rk+1 − rk. Thus, (18) is
simplified as
f(xk+1)− f(x∗)
η
+
〈
2r,Qxk+1
〉
≤ 1
η
(‖qk − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − qk‖2G)
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L+(x˜k − xk)
〉
+
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉
+
〈
xk+1 − x∗, L−(x˜k+1 − xk+1)
〉
=
1
η
(‖qk − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − q∗‖2G)− ‖Qxk+1‖22
− ‖Qξk+1‖22 + 2
〈
L+
2
(xk+1 − x∗), x˜k − xk
〉
+
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉
≤ 1
η
(‖qk − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − q∗‖2G)
− φmin(L−)
2
‖xk+1 − x∗‖22 − ‖Qξk+1‖22
+
2φmin(L−)
φ2max(L+)
‖L+
2
(xk+1 − x∗)‖22
+
φ2max(L+)
2φmin(L−)
‖x˜k − xk‖22 +
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉
≤ 1
η
(‖qk − q∗‖2G − ‖qk+1 − q∗‖2G)+ φ2max(L+)2φmin(L−)‖ξk‖22
+
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉 .
In the second inequality, we use 1t aˆ
2+tbˆ2 ≥ 2aˆbˆ for t > 0.
Based on Lemma 6, we give the following theorem to
establish the convergence rate of P-ADMM for the general
convex problem.
Theorem 5. Suppose the objective function f(x) is general
convex. In P-ADMM, for any K > 0, we have
E[f(xˆK)− f(x∗)] ≤ η‖Qx
0‖22
K
+
η‖x0 − x∗‖2L+
2
K
+
1
K
ηdφ2max(L+)
∑N
i=1(σ
2)1i
2φmin(L−)(1−R)
with 0 < R < 1, where the expectation is taking with respect
to the noise and xˆK = 1K
∑K−1
k=0 x
k+1.
Proof. Summing Lemma 6 from k = 0 to k = K − 1, we
have
1
η
(
K−1∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− f(x∗)) +
〈
2r,
K−1∑
k=0
Qxk+1
〉
≤
K−1∑
k=0
(
φ2max(L+)
2φmin(L−)
‖ξk‖22 +
〈
ξk+1, 2Q(rk+1 − r)〉)
+
1
η
‖q0 − q∗‖2G.
By setting r = 0, there is
1
η
(
K−1∑
k=0
f(xk+1)− f(x∗))
≤
K−1∑
k=0
(
φ2max(L+)
2φmin(L−)
‖ξk‖22 +
〈
ξk+1, 2Qrk+1
〉)
+ ‖Qx0‖22 + ‖x0 − x∗‖2L−
2
.
By taking expectation of above function and using Jensen’s
inequality, we have
E[f(xˆK)− f(x∗)]
≤ η‖Qx
0‖22
K
+
η‖x0 − x∗‖2L+
2
K
+
η
K
K−1∑
k=0
φ2max(L+)
2φmin(L−)
E‖ξk‖22
≤ η‖Qx
0‖22
K
+
η‖x0 − x∗‖2L+
2
K
+
1
K
ηdφ2max(L+)
∑N
i=1(σ
2)1i
2φmin(L−)(1−R) ,
where xˆK = 1K
∑K−1
k=0 x
k+1. In the first inequality, we use
E[ξk+1] = 0. In the second inequality, we use the sum of
infinity terms of geometric sequence.
Remark 2. Compared with the non-private decentralized
ADMM in [21], P-ADMM also achieves a O(1/K) rate for a
general convex problem. As we can see from above theorem, if
the variance of Gaussian noise decaying linearly with a rate
R ∈ (0, 1), then the averaged function value approaches the
minimum function value with a convergence rate of O(1/K).
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Fig. 1. Compare convergence and privacy for L2-regularized logistic regression: Total privacy loss  = 5.
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Fig. 3. Compare convergence and privacy for unregularized logistic regression.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We devote this section to experimentally evaluate the per-
formance of P-ADMM. In particular, we consider the loss
function for a commonly used model: logistic regression.
Given a sample (y, z), where y is a feature vector and
the corresponding label is z ∈ {+1,−1}, the L2-regularized
logistic regression loss function is defined as
L(z, y, w) = log(1 + exp(−zwT y)) + Λ‖w‖22,
which is Λ-strongly convex.
We also use the same real-world dataset as [9]–[11], i.e., the
Adult dataset from UCI Machine Learning Repository [23],
which consists of 48,842 personal records, including age,
education, occupation, work-class, sex, race, income, etc. The
goal is to predict whether the annual income is more than $50k
or not.
We use the following steps to preprocess the datasets. We
first remove all individuals with missing values and then use
one-hot encoding method to convert every categorical attribute
into a set of binary vectors. After that, we normalize all
numerical attributes such that the range of each value is [0, 1].
Finally, we transform labels of Adult {> 50k,≤ 50k} to
{+1,−1}.
In our experiments, we compare our P-ADMM algorithm
with benchmark algorithms under both the general convex and
strongly convex cases by using unregularzied (i.e. Λ = 0)
and regularized (i.e. Λ 6= 0) logistic regression loss functions.
The benchmark algorithms consist of DVP, M-ADMM and
R-ADMM. DVP is the name of dual variable perturbation
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Fig. 4. Compare accuracy for different agents: Total privacy loss  = 10.
method presented in [9] that perturbs the dual variable during
the iterative process. M-ADMM [10] is based on a penalty
perturbation method by adding a perturbation correlated to the
step size to ensure differential privacy of ADMM algorithm. R-
ADMM is a new variation of the differentially private ADMM
algorithm proposed in [11] that repeatedly uses the existing
computational results to make updates, which improves the
privacy-utility tradeoff significantly. To determine the practical
cost of privacy for convex optimization, we further use non-
private ADMM algorithm [22] as a non-private baseline to do
classification task on Adult dataset. Moreover, We compare
the convergence of P-ADMM with benchmark algorithms
under the same total privacy loss. To obtain the same total
privacy loss during the whole period, we carefully choose
noise parameters, respectively.
For each parameter setting, we conduct 10 independent runs
of algorithms. For each time, both the mean and standard
deviation of the average loss are recorded. Specially, we define
fk as the average loss over the training dataset of the k-th
experiment (1 ≤ k ≤ 10). The mean of the average loss
is fmean = 110
∑10
k=1 fk and the standard error is fstd =√
1
10
∑10
k=1(fk − fmean)2. The smaller the standard deviation
fstd the more stable of the algorithm. In all experiments, we
set δ = 0.0001.
We present the results of our experiments with L2-
regularized logistic regression for a small network (N = 5) in
Figure 1 and Figure 2. In particular, we first study the effect
of varying the value of different variance decrease rate R on
the convergence of P-ADMM. For the total privacy loss  = 5
(Figure 1) and  = 10 (Figure 2), we can see that the variance
decrease rate R = 0.995 results in a slower rate of privacy
loss accumulation compared to benchmark algorithms and has
quite low average loss during the iterative process. In the right
of Figure 1 and Figure 2, P-ADMM has the lowest average
loss compared to other differentially private algorithms. By
quantifying the average loss versus Non-private, P-ADMM
provides nearly the same convergence properties during the
entire process. Moreover, we set the variance decrease rate
R = 0.995 for the experiments with unregularized logistic
regression on a small network (N = 5), and present the results
in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, P-ADMM outperforms the
benchmark algorithms significantly in the small (a) and large
(b) total privacy loss.
We also evaluate the effect of different number of agents by
performing experiments with L2-regularized logistic regres-
sion for networks of different sizes. Note that we control the
total privacy loss to be the same during the entire iterative
process (K = 50) and varying the number of agents to
compare accuracy (i.e. average loss at the final iteration).
The results of this experiment are depicted in Figure 4. It
is clear that our algorithm continues to outperform R-ADMM
significantly for large networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a differentially private
ADMM algorithm (P-ADMM) to address privacy concerns
during the iterative process. In particular, we introduced Gaus-
sian noise with linearly decaying variance in each iteration
to preserves dynamic zCDP, a novel privacy framework that
enjoys significant accuracy and tight privacy loss composition.
We also theoretically analyzed convergence properties of the
proposed algorithm for general convex and strongly convex op-
timization objectives. By performing extensive empirical com-
parisons with state-of-the-art methods for differentially private
ADMM based machine learning algorithms, we demonstrated
that P-ADMM exhibits superior convergence performance
while providing strong privacy guarantee.
APPENDIX
Lemma 7. For b ∈ (0, 1) and κ4 > 1, we have (19) with
0 < θ ≤ b(1+ζ)φ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)
4bφ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)+16φ2max(M) .
Proof. By decomposing ‖qk+1 − qˆ∗‖2G and ‖qk − qˆ∗‖2G, the
result in Lemma 5 can be rewritten in the following form
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k+1 − x∗)‖22 + ‖η(rk+1 − r∗)‖22
≤ 1
1 + ζ
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k+1 − x∗)‖22 +
1
1 + ζ
‖η(rk+1 − r∗)‖22
+
P
1 + ζ
‖ξk+1‖22 +
1
1 + ζ
〈
ξk+1, ηL+(x˜
k+1 − x˜k)
+ 2ηQ(rk+1 − r∗) + 2ηM(xk+1 − x∗)〉
≤ 1
1 + ζ
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k+1 − x∗)‖22 +
1
1 + ζ
‖η(rk+1 − r∗)‖22
+
( P
1 + ζ
+
1/(2θ)
1 + ζ
)‖ξk+1‖22 + θ1 + ζ ‖ηL+2 (x˜k+1 − x˜k)
+ ηQ(rk+1 − r∗) + ηM(xk+1 − x∗)‖22
≤ 1
1 + ζ
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k+1 − x∗)‖22 +
1
1 + ζ
‖η(rk+1 − r∗)‖22
+
4θ
1 + ζ
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k+1 − x∗)‖22 +
4θ
1 + ζ
‖ηL+
2
(x˜k − x∗)‖22
+
4θ
1 + ζ
‖ηQ(rk+1 − r∗)‖22 +
4θ
1 + ζ
‖ηM(xk+1 − x∗)‖22
+
( P
1 + ζ
+
1/(2θ)
1 + ζ
)‖ξk+1‖22. (23)
(1− b)( 14 − θ1+ζ )φ2min(L+)‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 + (1− 4θ1+ζ )‖rk+1 − r∗‖22
≤ 1/4+θ1+ζ φ2max(L+)‖x˜k − x∗‖22 + 11+ζ ‖rk − r∗‖22 +
(P+1/(2θ)
1+ζ + b
(
1
4 − θ1+ζ
)
φ2min(L+)(κ4 − 1)
)‖ξk+1‖22 (19)
(
1
4 − θ1+ζ
)
φ2min(L+)‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 +
(
1− 4θ1+ζ
)‖rk+1 − r∗‖22
≤ 1/4+θ1+ζ φ2max(L+)‖x˜k − x∗‖22 + 11+ζ ‖rk − r∗‖22 + P+1/(2θ)1+ζ ‖ξk+1‖22 + 4θφ
2
max(M)
1+ζ ‖xk+1 − x∗‖22 (20)
b
(
1
4 − θ1+ζ
)
φ2min(L+)‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22
≥ b( 14 − θ1+ζ )φ2min(L+)(1− 1κ4 )‖xk+1 − x∗‖22 − b( 14 − θ1+ζ )φ2min(L+)(κ4 − 1)‖ξk+1‖22 (21)
(1− b)( 14 − θ1+ζ )φ2min(L+)‖x˜k+1 − x∗‖22 + (1− 4θ1+ζ )‖rk+1 − r∗‖22 + b( 14 − θ1+ζ )φ2min(L+)(1− 1κ4 )‖xk+1 − x∗‖22
≤ 1/4+θ1+ζ φ2max(L+)‖x˜k − x∗‖22 + 11+ζ ‖rk − r∗‖22 +
(P+1/(2θ)
1+ζ + b
(
1
4 − θ1+ζ
)
φ2min(L+)(κ4 − 1)
)‖ξk+1‖22
+
4θφ2max(M)
1+ζ ‖xk+1 − x∗‖22 (22)
In the second inequality, we use 1θa
2 + θb2 ≥ 2ab for θ > 0.
In the last inequality, we use ‖a+ b‖22 ≤ 2‖a‖22 + 2‖b‖22.
Rearranging the inequality (23) and diving by η2, we have
(20), where we choose θ and ζ to satisfy 14 − θ1+ζ > 0. Since
for any κ > 0 and any matrices C1 and C2 with the same
dimensions, there is
‖C1 + C2‖22 + (κ− 1)‖C1‖22 ≥ (1−
1
κ
)‖C2‖22, (24)
which implies ‖x˜k+1−x∗‖22 ≥ (1− 1κ4 )‖xk+1−x∗‖22− (κ4−
1)‖ξk+1‖22 for any κ4 > 1.
Then, for b ∈ (0, 1), we obtain (21). Combining (20) and
(21), we have (22).
Next, if we set θ ≤ b(1+ζ)φ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)
4bφ2min(L+)(1−1/κ4)+16φ2max(M) , itensures
b
(1
4
− θ
1 + ζ
)
φ2min(L+)(1−
1
κ4
) ≥ 4θφ
2
max(M)
1 + ζ
.
Thus, the inequality (22) can be written as (19).
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